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FThis paper was originally published in Inquiry, Volume 28, 1985, pages 417–
428. It is now included in The Selected Works of Arne Naess, SWAN X, 
Springer, 2005. It is reprinted here with slight revisions. . The Neither-nor and the Both-and answers 
n environmental debates there is a constant complaint against those 
ho fight to ‘save’ a natural being (a river, a wood, a sea, a kind of 
nimal or plant, a landscape) that they mainly express feelings and 
ubjective likes and dislikes. They are said to lack a sense of 
bjectivity, and ultimately lack adequate reference to reality as it is in 
act and not only reality as they feel it.  
 
ffective counterarguments need not be of a philosophical kind. But 
hose who happen to be at home with epistemology and related more or 
ess abstruse subjects might use this to their advantage. 
 
uppose we put our right hand, which has been exposed to cold air into 
 pot of water, and we exclaim, “ warm!” We then put our left hand, 
hich has not been exposed into the same pot, and we exclaim “ cold!” 
 
uestion: Is the water warm or cold? 
 
alileo’s kind of answer: Neither warm nor cold. The water, as such, or 
n itself, is neither warm nor cold. These are ‘secondary’ qualities. The 
ater as such has only ‘primary’ qualities.1
 
rotagoras’s answer, according to Sextus Empiricus: Both warm and 
old. The water has both qualities, but the condition of the hands has 
he effect that one of them only registers the warmth, the other only 
oldness.2
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Suppose we put our right foot which has been exposed to cold air into 
the calm sea, and we exclaim: “delicious!” or “encouraging!” or 
“cheering!” We then put our left foot which has not been exposed into 
the sea at the same spot, and we exclaim: “detestable!” or 
“discouraging!” or “abominable!” 
 
Protagoras’s opinion according to Sextus’s interpretation might also be 
that the sea is both encouraging and discouraging, and both delicious 
and detestable. Consequently, according to Protagoras, as interpreted by 
Sextus, as interpreted by me, water has all kinds of qualities, but a 
sensitive being is only able to experience a limited number of them. 
What it will experience depends on its state. 
  
The most interesting interpretation of ‘matter,’ as far as I can see, is 
such that it comprises all that man ever can experience in any state. And 
that the possibility is not excluded that other sensitive beings can 
experience additional ‘things’ which humans cannot.  
  
The most plausible interpretation of the passage is, unfortunately, not 
consistent with the addition: this conclusion seems unavoidable when 
reading what comes next in Chapter 32: 
 
 Therefore man becomes, according to him, the criterion of the 
existence of things. For all things, in so far as they appear to men, 
also exist, while those things that appear to no man do not exist at 
all. 
 
Strangely enough ‘matter’ seems to be dependent on the states of 
humans: it cannot comprise anything that cannot be apprehended by 
man. The set of states of human equals the set of states of matter. 
  
Protagoras’s ‘matter’ I take to be an ens rationis, a tentative abstract 
structure invented in order to somehow support ‘the appearances,’ like 
the elephant or tortoise invented to support the earth. 
  
In what follows, I shall maintain that Galileo’s Neither-nor position 
leads to absurdities. The position of Protagoras is deeply problematic, 
but can be saved from absurdity if somewhat freely interpreted. 
Furthermore, I shall maintain that it is philosophically tenable to 
maintain that the world we live in (the Lebenswelt) has secondary and 
tertiary qualities. What we feel about something belongs to the qualities 
of the world as we know it. What does not have such qualities is 
abstract structure. 
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Environmentalists talk about reality as it is in fact when they talk in 
terms of feelings. 
 
2. Rejection of absolutist Ding an sich conceptions 
 
The Galileo-type of answer uses a distinction that is useful within 
limits, but breaks down if absolutized. It is the famous distinction 
between things in themselves and things in relation to other things.  
(The term thing is taken in a very broad sense.) 
  
Essential to ecological thinking, and also to thinking in quantum 
physics, is the insistence that things cannot be separated from what 
surrounds them without smaller or greater arbitrariness. Thing A cannot 
be thought of in and of itself, because of internal relation to thing B. 
But neither is thing B separable, except superficially, from C, and so 
on. 
  
As we know them, things have properties referring to sensing, action, 
and comprehension. Such a primary quality as the shape of a thing 
varies with the perspective. There is no absolute shape of the thing-in-
itself. No quality of a thing is such that it is separable from others. 
General relativity excludes even movement or rest. There are no 
primary qualities. A triangle is either without extension as in axiomatic, 
formal geometry, or it has a colour, for instance, black. 
  
In thought and communication we need to separate, otherwise 
orientation gets to be impossible. The utterance “warm” relates to a 
whole set or constellation, but nominally and grammatically the 
utterance refers in our example just to ‘water.’ More precisely and 
specifically it refers to water in relation to a complex set or 
constellation of relata, of which the most obvious are the hand, the 
water, the medium, and the subject uttering “warm!” 
  
These relata, individually or collectively, are not things or entities in 
themselves, in spite of the existence of words and phrases suggesting 
the possibility of isolating each of them. The relations between the 
relata are internal. 
  
There is similarity between this view and those expressed by the 
Buddhist formula sarvam dharmam nihsvsbhavam. Every element is 
without ‘self existence.’ But the views I defend need no support from 
Buddhist philosophy: Western traditions suffice. 
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In short, the Both-and answer may be thus formulated: there are no 
completely separable objects, therefore no separable water or medium 
or organism. A concrete content can only be one-to-one related to an 
undividable structure, a constellation of factors. Concrete contents and 
abstract structures make up reality as it is in fact. It is misleading to call 
it real only as felt by a subject. 
  
The notion of irreducible constellations eliminates both objectivist and 
subjectivist views as characterized, for instance, by J. J. C. Smart in 
relation to colour.3 On the other hand, Protagoras’s view, as interpreted 
by Sextus, is an objectivist view. Water, as a piece of matter, is cold. 
Both answers can be saved however by expanding its basis: it should be 
related, not to water as a separable object, but to constellations 
corresponding to concrete contents. 
 
3. Secondary and tertiary qualities and the theory of projection 
 
As late as in the last part of the nineteenth century, mechanical 
conceptions of warmth and coldness were thought to imply the Neither-
nor answer. The experienced warmness or coldness is not a property of 
the water itself. To different temperatures of the water itself correspond 
certain levels of intensity of motion of its molecules. The motion in its 
capacity of being a primary quality is a property of the water in itself. 
Primary qualities, intrinsic or in the objects themselves were conceived 
to be part of reality itself. The felt warmth was considered to have only 
a strange kind of subjective existence: not in the brain, not in space. 
General relativity and quantum physics undermined the thing-in-itself 
conception, but did not cause any widespread major change of opinion. 
  
Concrete contents have a one-to-one correlation with constellations: 
there is an isomorphy between the concrete and the abstract. When we 
say that the sea now is grey, the water of the sea is only one part of the 
constellation. Nevertheless it is somehow the dominant part. We would 
not say that the air between the sea and us is grey, or that we are grey. 
The sea has thousands of individual colour hues as inherent properties, 
but not as an isolated thing. One must take the colour of the heavens, 
the colour of the plankton, the waves, the senses of observers, into 
consideration. The colours of the sea are parts of innumerable gestalts. 
  
According to the traditional doctrine of primary, secondary, and tertiary 
qualities or properties, colour is the projection upon the surfaces of 
things of colour-sensations generated by the senses. Only as a 
consequence of this projection do they look green, white, black, etc. 
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The perception of greenness in the mind is projected into the external 
world. 
 
The identification of primary properties with those of objects 
themselves leads to a conception of nature without any of the qualities 
we experience spontaneously. There is no good reason that we should 
not look upon such a bleak nature as just a resource. Every appeal to 
save parts of nature based on reference to sense qualities of any kind 
gets to be meaningless. Every passionate appeal revealing deep 
feelings, empathy, and even identification with natural phenomena must 
then be ruled out as irrelevant. The sphere of real facts is narrowed 
down to those of mechanically interpreted mathematical physics. 
  
Worse still: the question of how secondary and tertiary qualities come 
to be unreal is often answered by pointing to a (verily miraculous) 
capacity of the human senses and the human mind to create the colours 
and the beauty. A poet, says A. N. Whitehead ironically, should not 
praise the roses but himself who makes the roses red and beautiful. 
(Whitehead is, incidentally one of the few Western philosophers who 
clearly opposed the doctrine of primary qualities.) 
  
With these aberrations in mind, I think it might be of value in deep 
ecology theorizing to suggest ontologies in which secondary and 
tertiary qualities are at least on a par with the primary ones. 
  
The ontology I wish to defend is such that the primary properties (in a 
narrow sense) are entia rationis characteristic of abstract structures, but 
not contents of reality. Structures may be both, namely structures of 
gestalts, but not the ones I now refer to. The geometry of the world is 
not a geometry in the world. 
  
The Both-and answer as elaborated here emphatically rejects the theory 
of projection. There is no such process as projection of sense-qualities. 
The theory is a clever invention that makes it possible to retain the 
notion of things in themselves retaining their separate identity in spite 
of the bewildering diversity of secondary and tertiary qualities. But the 
price of this conservation of the Galilean ontology is high: there is no 
evidence whatsoever of a process of projection. 
  
4. The subject/object distinction and the theory of duplication 
  
Suppose three people are said to point to the same tree but to attribute 
to the tree three completely different sets of secondary and tertiary 
qualities. How should we deal with the contradiction? 
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At a superficial level, contradictions are avoided by certain ways of 
talking: “The tree looks so and so to me.” “I feel the tree to be so and 
so.” A mere diversity of conscious experience is acknowledged, 
therefore no contradiction arises on this level. 
  
Inside the consciousness of person P1 there is an experience or image E1 
of a tree with the following characteristics . . . ; in P2 there is E2, in P3, 
E3, E1, E2 and E3 all being different. The tree in the external world 
confronting P1, P2 and P3 may be the same, and its properties are the 
primary ones, most adequately described by contemporary physics. The 
consequences: in the example we get as many as four trees, one 
external, and three internal. When nobody looks at the tree, the three 
internal ones disappear and the external one is left alone. 
  
This way of avoiding contradictions between two or more observers 
results in the famous duplication: there is a tree outside in the external 
world and a tree inside in the mind of the observer. The tree outside is 
today conceived in extremely abstract form because of the development 
of physics, as a structure with no similarity to the internal trees. In the 
1890s, the external tree still had some perceptual (anschauliche) 
properties. Since Einstein and Heisenberg these are all gone. But Bohr 
has shown how this disappearance brings us back to the reality of 
laboratory constellations with secondary qualities. 
  
The tree in the mind does not any longer have the character of an image 
or a copy, because the external tree of physics has no similarity with the 
internal one. Furthermore the internal is in the mind in a non-spatial 
sense. It is not in the brain because then it would have been seen long 
ago by doctors. It is not even near the brain. If the external tree and the 
body of the observer are in Rome, this does not imply that the tree in 
the observer’s mind is in or near Rome. It is not nearer Rome than the 
Andromeda nebula. It is not in physical space at all. Where is it? 
  
The tree in the mind is private in principle, belonging to a specific 
person or animal, it is ‘subjective.’ The tree outside is ‘objective,’ 
supposedly completely independent of any perceivers, and a thing in 
itself. 
  
All this is rather confusing. The duplication theory does not seem 
understandable to anybody. Nevertheless, if we take the Neither-nor 
answer as a basic assumption, it is difficult to avoid accepting a kind of 
duplication theory and a sharp, pervasive subject/object dualism. 
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The Both-and answer is also far from intuitively obvious, at least in our 
culture. But I think it can be effectively defended. 
 
5. Spontaneous experience without subject/object cleavage, abstract 
structures 
 
When absorbed in contemplation of a concrete, natural thing, there is no 
experience of a subject/object relation. Nor is there when absorbed in 
vivid action, whether in movement or not. There is no epistemological 
ego reaching out to see and understand a tree or an opponent in a fight, 
or a problem of decision. A tree is always part of a total, a gestalt. 
Analysis may discover many structural ingredients: sometimes an ego-
relation, sometimes not. The gestalt is a whole, self-contained and self-
sufficient. If we call it “experience of the gestalt,” we are easily misled 
in a subjectivist direction. 
  
When describing a constellation of gestalt relations, it is important not 
to let the usual stress on the epistemological subject/object distinction 
dominate the expression. In a spontaneous experience there may or may 
not be any ingredient corresponding to the distinction. 
  
‘Tiny me looking into the eye of a big whale’ may be a concrete content 
with an ego-relation as a genuine part. It is different from previous 
examples because the qualities are not all sense-qualities. The unity of 
this concrete contact is best understood by stressing its gestalt character. 
The example refers to a gestalt of a fairly high order, that is, having 
lower order gestalts as ‘parts.’ 
  
If ‘cheerful tree’ and ‘dark and threatening tree’ are two spontaneous 
expressions, analysis in terms of relations may conclude that they refer 
to ‘the same’ tree. But this sameness is definable only in terms of an 
abstract structure, whereas utterances refer to two concrete contents. 
 
The structure referred to is abstract and not to be confused with gestalt 
structures within the concrete content. The tree may have branches and 
the colour may contrast with a dark background. This reveals a 
structure within the total gestalt. This structure is given 
‘phenomenologically,’ as structure within the concrete content. The 
sameness of the tree defined through abstract structures presupposes 
location in space of a kind that cannot be conceived as structure of a 
gestalt. It is an abstract structure, an ens rationis, in so far as every 
theory, including that of gravitation, is human-made. 
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My analysis at this point presumably implies a rather radical form of 
nominalism, but I shall not try to make it explicit. Only mention that it 
is closely related to the view that relations between things, or more 
specifically concrete contents, are not part of the world. Primary 
qualities, for instance shape, do not occur in our life space except as 
contrasts between colours, for instance a black circle on a white 
background. The concept ‘circle’ as abstracted from this concrete 
content is an ens rationis according to the above. The nominalism 
implied here is a nominalism of abstract relations. Problematic is the 
place of entia rationis, ‘themselves,’ within gestalts of high order. A 
discussion of this is important, and also the more general question of 
intentional entities and intentionality. But I do not find it feasible to go 
into this in the present article.4
 
6. From ethics to ontology and from ontology to ethics5
 
Confrontations between developers reveal differences in estimating 
what is real. What a conservationist sees and experiences as reality the 
developer does not see—and vice versa. A conservationist sees and 
experiences a forest as a unity, a gestalt, and speaking of the heart of 
the forest, he or she does not speak about the geometrical centre. A 
developer sees square kilometres of trees and argues that a road through 
the forest covers very few square kilometres, so why make so much 
fuss? And if the conservers insist, he will propose that the road does not 
touch the centre of the forest. The heart is then saved, he thinks. The 
difference between the antagonists is rather one of ontology, than one 
of ethics. The gestalts “the heart of the forest,” “the life of the river,” 
and “the quietness of the lake” are parts of reality for the 
conservationist. To the conservationist the developer seems to suffer 
from a kind of deeply based blindness. But his ethics in environmental 
questions is based largely on how he sees reality. There is no way of 
making him eager to save a forest as long as he retains his conception 
of it as a set of trees. His charge that the conservationist is motivated by 
subjective feelings is firmly based on his view of reality. His own 
strong positive feelings towards development he considers are based on 
objective reality, and as long as the society is dominated by developers, 
he need not be passionate. It is the struggling minorities who are 
passionate rather than those who follow the mainstream 
  
It is important, I think, in the philosophy of environmentalism, to move 
from ethics to ontology and back. Clarification of differences in 
ontology may contribute significantly to the clarification of different 
policies and their ethical bases. And one of the first things to do might 
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be to get rid of the belief that humankind is something placed in an 
environment! 
  
Starting from concrete contents in our analysis, the is/ought and 
fact/value dichotomies look a little different than from where Hume 
started, namely from factual and value affirmations. Expressions of 
concrete contents are designations, not declarative sentences. 
  
Expressions of the kind “object x has value y” immediately lead to the 
question: given an object x, how do I assess its value y? If we start with 
designations of concrete contents, for instance “delicious, red tomato to 
be eaten at once!” or “repugnant rotten tomato,” the evaluative terms 
are there from the very beginning of our analysis. And there is no 
separable tomato to value! 
  
In his paper “Is/Ought Dichotomy and Environmental Ethics” (under 
publication) David Bennett says that John Passmore and Aldo Leopold 
“agree on the basic ecological fact, but differ on how to value this fact. 
Passmore imports a restricted sense of obligation and maintains the 
fact/value dichotomy. Leopold accepts the community as both a 
descriptive and prescriptive statement.”  
  
Perhaps the point of view of Leopold could be explicated by starting 
with designations of concrete contents of various sorts expressing what 
Leopold sees and experiences as community. The terms of the 
designations will inevitably include valuations. There would then, 
strictly speaking, be no fact which they agree about nor any value that 
they disagree about. Bennett seems to take an ontological point of view, 
close to that of Callicott: “ecology changes our values by changing our 
concepts of the world of ourselves in relation to the world. It reveals 
new relations among objects which, once revealed, stir our ancient 
centers of moral feeling.”6 The stirring is part of a gestalt and as such 
not to be isolated from the ‘objects.’ What I have done is to try to 
explicate what kind of change in concept of the world and status of the 
subject is at issue. 
  
I propose to identify the world with the set of contents, not with 
structures. This means that the two contents referred to above are two 
parts of the world. The world has structures, but does not reveal them. 
We make conceptual constructs to cope with them, but they are all man-
made. Gravity does not pull planets! 
  
Between the parts of the world conceived as contents in the form of 
gestalts there are internal structural relations. But these are 
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distinguished from the abstract structure found or invented by science. 
The physicist’s ‘world of science’ is entirely one of abstract structure. 
Even the hues of colours are defined structurally through places in 
colour-atlases. The ecosystem concept is used to describe abstract 
structures, and the movement of deep ecology is to a large extent 
concerned with abstract structures. The importance of abstract structural 
considerations cannot be overestimated. 
  
But the factors introduced in abstract analysis should not, as is usually 
done, be identified with objects in the world. They do not belong to the 
content of the world we are genuinely part of. Abstract structures are 
structures of the world, not in the world. 
  
7. Appearance and reality, perspectivism 
 
If we permit ourselves to use the terms realness and reality, I shall 
maintain that there is no reality ‘behind’ the contents. The abstract 
structures may be said to be real, but any definite one in the form of a 
theoretical construct is an ens rationis, but they are not ‘behind’ or 
‘underneath’ the contents. 
  
What then about the distinction between appearance and reality? Does 
the stress on contents favour appearance? No. If it did, something in the 
above argumentation has gone wrong. 
  
We have useful kinds of expressions such as “It appears to be so and so, 
but it is not really so and so.” If I express a content through the words 
“cheerful tree” and we add: “Let us place it in our window!” My friend 
may say “The tree is in reality very big and cannot be placed in our 
window. You are deceived by the great distance.” Or, when somebody 
stands on the southern rim of Grand Canyon pointing north towards the 
northern side he may utter “How is it that there is only moss on the 
northern rim?” But his friend may not agree: “You are mistaken. The 
‘moss’ is really a wood. The distance deceives you.” The 
appearance/reality distinction in the above examples relates to 
statements which are true or false, not to designations of concrete 
contents. 
  
If by ‘appearance’ we mean something that by definition or intrinsically 
is appearance to a person, we have presumed a subject/object 
distinction that cannot be generalized and adapted to a description of 
the world as concrete contents. 
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The rhetorics of environmentalism favour positive evaluation of natural 
phenomena. But, of course, concrete contents may include negative. A 
prisoner in 1977 on Antarctic Dawson Island uttered “sun, cold and 
unfriendly,” and similar expressions are common in any climate. The 
ontological emancipation of tertiary qualities does not imply uniformly 
positive evaluation of natural phenomena. In the terminology of gestalts 
one may say that religion has tried to conceive the most comprehensive 
gestalt to be (intrinsically, of course) good, and Spinoza uses the term 
perfect characterizing Deus sive Natura. But the problem of evil is still 
open. Nietzsche and others have used the term perspective in a way 
similar to that of the above term content: the world is the total set of 
perspectives. But usually we find the subject/object distinction implied 
in perspective. The world is seen by subjects in different perspectives. 
The tree looks different according to the perspective of the observer. By 
walking around we see the tree from different angles. Thus, 
‘perspectivism’ may mislead. 
  
Similar reflections hold good concerning the terminology of Dewey and 
others of ‘experience.’ It is too natural to say “experience by whom?” 
“My experience,” “your experience,” and so on. The term content does 
not so easily lend itself to the introduction of a subject/object division. 
But if used carefully the term experience may not mislead. 
  
8. Gestalt ontology and the deep ecology movement 
 
Our starting point has been the Neither-nor and Both-and answer to 
questions whether a thing has this or a different quality. As already 
mentioned, elaboration of the answers may lead in different directions. I 
am not maintaining that my elaboration is the only consistent one. The 
situation in epistemology and ontology is rather problematic. What I 
maintain is that the framework of gestalt ontology is adequate, but 
scarcely the only adequate one, when trying to give deep ecology 
movement principles a philosophical foundation. The world of concrete 
contents has gestalt character, not atomic character. I do not know of 
any better frame of reference than that of gestalts. 
  
This account does not, as mentioned, minimize the importance of 
abstract structures such as ecosystems (with stress on “system”). But 
clearly the theoretical debate centring on such concepts as ‘mature 
ecosystem’ shows the man-made character of the conceptual world. 
When some ecologists negate the existence of mature systems, this does 
not imply the negation of any content of the world we live in. (The 
Lebenswelt). 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 I take Galileo as representative of the Neither-nor answer because of his crucial position 
in the development of modern physics. There are of course a number of slightly or 
significantly different concepts of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities. In the context of 
this paper, the essential aspect of primary qualities is their status as inherent in the objects 
themselves. Locke elaborates the ‘neither warm nor cold’ answer in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. 
2 The crucial passage concerning Protagoras in Sextus’s Outline of Pyrrhonism I, Chapter 
32, runs as follows: 
Now, this man says that matter is a state of flux. As it flows, continuous 
additions may arise to take the place of the effluxions, and the senses undergo 
transformation and alternation in accordance with one’s age and with other 
conditions of the body. He says also that the grounds of all appearances lie in 
the matter, so that in itself its power enables it to be all those things which 
appear to all beings capable of apprehension. And men apprehend different 
things at different times because the conditions they are in are different. The 
man who is in a natural state, he says, apprehends those material substances that 
can appear to those who are in a natural state, and a person who is in an 
unnatural state apprehends those things which can appear to those in an 
unnatural state. And the same reasoning applies as well to differences depending 
on one’s age, one’s sleeping or waking state, and every kind of condition. 
3 J. J. C. Smart, 1961, 128. 
4 The nominalism I subscribe to is a consequence of the philosophy of hypothetical-
deductive systems formulated in Naess, 1972. 
5 The term ontology is useful for naming that part of one’s philosophy of science which 
tells ‘what there is.’ In physics and astronomy, a hundred years ago, there were atoms, 
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ether, planets, stars, and forces acting upon these so-called objects. Today, the ontology 
proposed by astronomers and physicists is more complicated and is steadily being 
modified. It is mostly called classification of objects, not ontology, but the function is 
clearly to classify what there is according to their sciences. 
Ontology as part of a philosophy and not only a group of sciences is, of course, a 
much more controversial affair. And it must somehow accommodate the objects that 
the sciences talk about, or give reasons for their non-existence. And which are the 
criteria of existence? Different views are open for discussion. 
Until recently the (basic) ontology of physics could be understood by people other than 
physicists. Now this is scarcely the case. The popularizations are wonderfully well 
written, but do not furnish adequate understanding. Some would lament this situation, but 
I think it is the most positive thing happening for a long time: it makes it clearer to all 
concerned that any account we offer about the world we live in (Lebenbswelt) must be 
independent of the ontology of modern physics. 
6 J. Baird Callicott, 1982, 174. 
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